Research Catalog

Details

Additional authors

1. Tavits, Margit

Description

1. xviii, 199 pages : illustrations; 24 cm

Summary

1. "Corruption is a significant problem for democracies throughout the world. Even the most democratic countries constantly face the threat of corruption and the consequences of it at the polls. Why are some governments more corrupt than others, even after considering cultural, social, and political characteristics? In Clarity of Responsibility, Accountability, and Corruption, the authors argue that clarity of responsibility is critical for reducing corruption in democracies. The authors provide a number of empirical tests of this argument, including a cross-national time-series statistical analysis to show that the higher the level of clarity the lower the perceived corruption levels. Using survey and experimental data, the authors show that clarity causes voters to punish incumbents for corruption. Preliminary tests further indicate that elites respond to these electoral incentives and are more likely to combat corruption when clarity is high"--

Subject

1. Political corruption
2. Korruption
3. Politik

Contents

1. A clarity of responsibility theory of corruption -- A dataset of democracy and corruption -- Clarity of responsibility and aggregate corruption perceptions -- Corruption voting : a survey analysis -- Corruption voting : an experimental analysis -- Elite anticorruption efforts -- Elite attention to corruption.

Call number

1. JFE 16-9961

Bibliography (note)

1. Includes bibliographical references and index.

Author

1. Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie A., author.

Title

1. Clarity of responsibility, accountability, and corruption / Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer, Margit Tavits.

Publisher

1. New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2016.

Type of content

1. text

Type of medium

1. unmediated

Type of carrier

1. volume

Bibliography

1. Includes bibliographical references and index.

Added author

1. Tavits, Margit, author.

LCCN

1. 2015048871

ISBN

1. 9781107127647 hardback
2. 1107127645 hardback

Research call number

1. JFE 16-9961