No miracles : the failure of Soviet decision-making in the Afghan War
- Title
- No miracles : the failure of Soviet decision-making in the Afghan War / Michael R. Fenzel.
- Published by
- Stanford, California : Stanford Security Studies, an imprint of Stanford University Press, [2017]
- ©2017
- Author
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Status | Format | Access | Call number | Item location |
---|---|---|---|---|
Status Available - Can be used on site. Please visit New York Public Library - Schwarzman Building to submit a request in person. | FormatText | AccessUse in library | Call numberJFE 18-1066 | Item locationSchwarzman Building - Main Reading Room 315 |
Details
- Description
- x, 180 pages; 24 cm
- Subject
- Genre/Form
- History.
- Contents
- The Soviet failure in Afghanistan -- Setting the stage : evolution of party-military relations -- Getting in : Leonid Brezhnev and the Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan -- No retreat ... no miracles : Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko in Afghanistan (1980-1985) -- Gorbachev's quest for "reluctant, silent agreement" to withdraw from Afghanistan -- Getting out : Gorbachev and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan (1986-1989) -- Losing Afghanistan.
- Call number
- JFE 18-1066
- Bibliography (note)
- Includes bibliographical references and index.
- Author
- Fenzel, Michael R., author.
- Title
- No miracles : the failure of Soviet decision-making in the Afghan War / Michael R. Fenzel.
- Publisher
- Stanford, California : Stanford Security Studies, an imprint of Stanford University Press, [2017]
- Copyright date
- ©2017
- Type of content
- text
- Type of medium
- unmediated
- Type of carrier
- volume
- Bibliography
- Includes bibliographical references and index.
- Chronological term
- 1979-1989
- LCCN
- 2015047412
- ISBN
- 9780804798181 hardcover ; alkaline paper
- 0804798184 hardcover ; alkaline paper
- Research call number
- JFE 18-1066