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Making sense of subsidiarity : how much centralization for Europe?.

Title
  1. Making sense of subsidiarity : how much centralization for Europe?.
Published by
  1. London : CEPR, 1993.

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Details

Additional authors
  1. Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain)
Description
  1. xvii, 165 pages : illustrations; 21 cm.
Series statement
  1. Monitoring European integration ; 4
  2. A CEPR annual report ; 1993
Uniform title
  1. Monitoring European integration ; 1993.
  2. Monitoring European integration ; 4.
Subject
  1. European Economic Community
  2. Subsidiarity > Economic aspects
  3. Europe > Economic integration
  4. Economic integration
  5. Europe
Contents
  1. 1. Introduction. 1.1. The Purpose of this Report. 1.2. Subsidiarity: What is the Question? 1.3. Why Does the Burden of Proof Matter? 1.4. Centralization and Decentralization: Their General Merits. 1.5. Rights of Control and Incompleteness of Contracts -- 2. The Allocation of Powers in the European Community. 2.1. The Allocation of Competences in the European Community. 2.2. The Instruments of Community Legislation and their Implementation. 2.3. Subsidiarity in the Treaty of Maastricht. 2.4. The Nature of Community Power. 2.5. A Comparison with Existing Federations -- 3. The Principles of Subsidiarity. 3.1. The Benefits of Centralization. 3.2. The Advantages of Decentralization. 3.3. Which Powers Should Go Together? 3.4. Accountability and Subsidiarity: The Evidence. 3.5. The Need for Flexibility: Centralization and Policy Reform. 3.6. What Kinds of Jurisdiction Should There Be? 3.7. Centralization, Decentralization and the Second-best.
  2. A3.1. The Invisible Foot: Does the Tiebout Hypothesis Justify Decentralized Government? -- A3.2. Centralization and Accountability -- 4. Factor Mobility, Fiscal Competition and the Survival of the Nation State. 4.1. Factor Mobility. 4.2. Principles of Tax Design. 4.3. Fiscal Externalities. 4.4. Accountability: The Argument Against Coordination at the EC Level. 4.5. Can Capital Income Taxes Survive? 4.6. Competing for VAT Revenue. 4.7. The Erosion of the Welfare State? 4.8. Old Age Pensions and Public Debt -- 5. Social Europe, Social Dumping and Subsidiarity. 5.1. Diverse Social Arrangements... 5.2. ...To be Harmonized? 5.3. Social Spillovers in Well-functioning Labour Markets? 5.4. The Second-best, Fiscal Competition and Social Dumping. 5.5. Minimum Wages and Social Competition. 5.6. Market Power and the Erosion of Labour Market Rents. 5.7. Dumping the Social Chapter -- 6. Fiscal Policy and Macroeconomic Stabilization. 6.1. Insurance versus Borrowing. 6.2. Moral Hazard. 6.3. Time Inconsistency.
  3. 6.4. Adverse Selection. 6.5. Insuring Nations. 6.6. Spillovers. 6.7. Limitations Imposed by the Maastricht Treaty -- 7. Subsidiarity and Regulatory Policy. 7.1. Competition Policy: Mergers, Takeovers and Joint Ventures. 7.2. Environmental Regulation. 7.3. Agriculture. 7.4. Regional Policy and the Structural Funds. 7.5. The European Satellite Industry -- 8. Concluding Remarks.
Owning institution
  1. Columbia University Libraries
Bibliography (note)
  1. Bibliography: p. 163-165.