Who am I? Who is she? : a naturalistic, holistic, somatic approach to personal identity / Gerard P. Montague.

Title
  1. Who am I? Who is she? : a naturalistic, holistic, somatic approach to personal identity / Gerard P. Montague.
Published by
  1. Frankfurt : Ontos Verlag, 2012.
Author
  1. Montague, Gerard P.

Items in the library and off-site

Filter by

Displaying 1 item

StatusFormatAccessCall numberItem location
StatusFormatTextAccessRequest in advanceCall numberBD438.5 .M66 2012Item locationOff-site

Details

Description
  1. 331 p.; 22 cm.
Alternative title
  1. Naturalistic, holistic, somatic approach to personal identity
Subject
  1. Person
  2. Identitàˆt
  3. Naturalismus
  4. Self (Philosophy)
  5. Identity (Philosophical concept)
  6. Self
  7. Identity (Psychology)
  8. Naturalism
Contents
  1. Machine generated contents note: 1. Quintessence, Aims and Structure -- 1.1. General Introduction -- 1.2. Working Definitions -- 1.3. Who Am I? Who Is She? -- 1.4. Methodological Considerations -- 1.5. Structure of the Argument -- 1.6. Note on Orthography and Typography -- 1.7. Building Arches -- 2. Self and Identity in Historical Context -- 2.1. Origins of Mind, Soul, Self and Identity -- 2.2. Pre-History to Plato -- 2.3. Early Christian Dualism -- 2.4. The Middle Age and the Soul -- 2.5. Renaissance and Reason: Descartes to Locke -- 2.6. Science Intervenes: Darwin to Freud -- 2.7. The Story so Far -- 2.8. General Historical Inferences -- 3. Dualism, Monism and the End of the Debate -- 3.1. Death of the Soul? -- 3.2. Predicate Dualism -- 3.3. Property Dualism and the Mind-Body Problem -- 3.4. The Zombie Debate -- 3.5. Two Classes of Dualism? And Monism? -- 3.6. Perspectives for Mind and Personal Identity -- 4. Body, Brain and Mind -- 4.1. Embodiment -- 4.2. What the Mind Cannot Be -- 4.3. Things, Functions and Processes -- 4.4. Body, Mind and World -- 4.5. What Do We Need the Body to Do? -- 4.6. The Making of the Mind -- 4.7. Conscious and Unconscious Mind -- 4.8. `My' Philosophy of Mind -- 5. Aspects of Personal Identity -- 5.1. Dimensions of the Debate -- 5.2. Conditions of Personhood -- Dimension (A) -- 5.3. Unity of Person -- Dimension (B) -- 5.4. The Meaning of Identity -- 5.5. Persistence of Person -- Dimension (C) -- 5.6. Structure of Personality -- Dimension (D) -- 5.7. The Body in Philosophy -- 5.8. Summing up on Personal Identity -- 6. Some Reductionist Approaches -- 6.1. Aspects of Reductionism -- 6.2. Psychological Continuity and Replication -- 6.3. Body Transplant and the Somatic Aspect -- 6.4. Further Reductionist Discussions -- 6.5. Frankenstein's Monster -- 6.6. Reflections on Reductionist Debate -- 7. Qualitative Aspects of Self and Identity -- 7.1. Introductory Remark -- 7.2. Constitution of the Self -- 7.3. Cultural Aspect of Identity -- 7.4. Relating Self to Other -- 7.5. Memory, Continuity and Identity -- 7.6. Broader Aspects of Memory -- 7.7. Additional Aspects of Continuity -- 7.8. Phenomena of Identity -- 8. The Narrative Approach -- 8.1. Living a Life and Narrating a Life -- 8.2. Narratives as Stories or Plots -- 8.3. Analytic Reconstruction of Narrative -- 8.4. Narrative Approach as Resolution and Solution -- 8.5. Beginning and End of Personal Narrative -- 8.6. From a Narrative Approach to an Ethical Aspect -- 8.7. Questioning Narrativity -- 8.8. From Narrativity to Meaning -- 8.9. Conclusions on Narrative -- 9. Holistic Identity in a Naturalistic World -- 9.1. Naturalistic, Holistic, Somatic Identity -- 9.2. The Core of Personal Identity.
Owning institution
  1. Harvard Library
Bibliography (note)
  1. Includes bibliographical references.
Processing action (note)
  1. committed to retain