Research Catalog

Caging the nuclear genie : an American challenge for global security

Title
  1. Caging the nuclear genie : an American challenge for global security / Stansfield Turner.
Published by
  1. Boulder, Colo. : Westview Press, ©1997.
Author
  1. Turner, Stansfield, 1923-2018

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FormatTextAccessUse in libraryCall numberU264 .T87 1997Item locationOff-site

Details

Description
  1. xi, 163 pages : illustrations; 24 cm
Summary
  1. The Cold War may be over, but you wouldn't know it from the tens of thousands of nuclear weapons still held by Russia and the United States. Arguing that the time has come to dispense with incremental approaches to arms control, Admiral Stansfield Turner, the former head of the CIA and an experienced senior military commander, proposes a practical yet safe plan that would move the world into a new and secure era. Turner carefully analyzes how many nuclear weapons are really needed to maintain our national security, regardless of how many weapons of mass destruction other nations may have. He then offers a dramatic, unilateral American initiative - to place all of the world's nuclear warheads in "strategic escrow" whereby none would be ready for immediate use; to initiate a pledge of "no first-use" and call on other nations to do the same; and to build national defenses against nuclear attack when they become cost-effective.
Subject
  1. Umschulungswerkstätten für Siedler und Auswanderer Bitterfeld
  2. No first use (Nuclear strategy)
  3. Security, International
  4. Nuclear weapons > International cooperation
  5. Nuclear weapons > International cooperation
  6. Security, International
  7. Erstschlag
  8. Kernwaffe
  9. Rüstungsbegrenzung
  10. Sicherheitspolitik
  11. Verzicht
  12. Russland
Contents
  1. The problem. The spell cast by nuclear weapons -- The theory. Points of non-recovery. Points of self-deterrence. Controlled response -- The solution. Strategic escrow. No first-use. Defenses. A new vision. Reshaping decisionmaking. The Sine qua non -- citizen support -- The lethality of nuclear weapons -- Excerpts from "Nuclear Crash -- The U.S. Economy After Small Nuclear Attacks," / M. Anjali Sastry, Joseph J. Romm, and Kosta Tsipis -- Calculation of Russian forces surviving a U.S. preemptive attack.
Owning institution
  1. Princeton University Library
Bibliography (note)
  1. Includes bibliographical references (p. 150-155) and index.